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The Climate for Human Rights 
REBECCA M. BRATSPIES* 
Climate change is the defining challenge of the 21st cen-
tury. The United States government is currently ignoring the 
problem, but wishful thinking alone will not keep global 
mean temperature rise below 2ºC. This Article proposes a 
way forward. It advises environmental decision-makers to 
use human rights norms to guide them as they make deci-
sions under United States law. By reframing their discretion 
through a human rights lens, decision-makers can use their 
existing authority to respond to the super-wicked problem of 
climate change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“[N]o matter how well-informed you are, you are surely not 
alarmed enough.”1 
 
Human impacts on the globe have become so omnipresent that 
the term “Anthropocene” is no longer an esoteric debate among sci-
entists.2 The proposition that we have entered a new geologic era—
one dominated by human activities, rather than geological forces—
has become conventional wisdom.3 The many unsustainable prac-
tices4 that make up the Anthropocene threaten our ability to “pre-
serve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to 
which life on earth is adapted.”5 Nowhere is the Anthropocene more 
                                                                                                             
 1 David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG. (July 9, 2017, 
9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earth-
too-hot-for-humans.html. 
 2 See Jan Zalasiewicz et al., The New World of the Anthropocene, 44 ENVTL. 
SCI. TECH. 2228, 2228 (2010); Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind, 
415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002). 
 3 Zalasiewicz et al., supra note 2, at 2228. 
 4 E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Enter the Anthropocene—Age of Man, NAT’L GEO. 
(Mar. 2011), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/03/age-of-man/kolbert-
text. We are in the midst of the 6th mass extinction. Damian Carrington, Earth’s 
Sixth Mass Extinction Event Under Way, Scientists Warn, GUARDIAN (July 10, 
2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earths-
sixth-mass-extinction-event-already-underway-scientists-warn. Toxic chemicals 
are accumulating throughout the global environment. See generally FRANCIS O. 
ADEOLA, INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS, TOXIC WASTE, AND COMMUNITY 
IMPACT: HEALTH EFFECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRUGGLES AROUND 
THE GLOBE (2012); Kristen S. Schafer & Susan E. Kegley, Persistent Toxic Chem-
icals in the US Food Supply, 56 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY HEALTH 813, 813–15 
(2002); Yukie Mato et al., Plastic Resin Pellets as a Transport Medium for Toxic 
Chemicals in the Marine Environment, 35 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 318, 318 (2001). At 
the same time, human global population is rising exponentially. Dep’t of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs: Population Division, World Population Prospects: Key 
Findings and Advance Tables, at 1 tbl.1, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP/248 (2017), 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf. 
 5 James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity 
Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 217 (2008). 
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visible than when considering the rapid pace of human-induced cli-
mate change.6 In September 2016, the Scripps Institute announced 
that global atmospheric carbon dioxide levels crossed the 400 ppm 
line permanently (or at least for “the indefinite future”).7 Indeed, we 
have known for nearly two decades that “it is not a question of 
whether the Earth’s climate will change, but rather when, where, and 
by how much.”8 
Life in a 400 ppm world will be very different from how humans 
have experienced the Earth throughout our 200,000 year history.9 
We are already seeing glimmers of what that new world will be like. 
During a recent heatwave, Arizona residents took to social media 
with photos of eggs, cookies, and meat cooking in the sun;10 and 
                                                                                                             
 6 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter IPCC]. 
 7 Rob Monroe, Notes on Reaching the Annual Low Point, SCRIPPS 
INSTITUTION OF OCEANOGRAPHY: THE KEELING CURVE (Sept. 23, 2016), 
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2016/09/23/note-on-reaching-
the-annual-low-point/; Brian Kahn, Earth’s CO2 Passes the 400 PPM Thresh-
old—Maybe Permanently, SCI. AMERICAN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.scien-
tificamerican.com/article/earth-s-co2-passes-the-400-ppm-threshold-maybe-per-
manently/ (explaining that, for the first time, September 2016 carbon dioxide lev-
els remained above 400 parts per million). Four hundred ppm is a symbolic mile-
stone, representing decades of locked-in warming, no matter what happens to re-
duce carbon emissions in the present or future. Michael Slezak, World’s Carbon 
Dioxide Concentration Teetering on the Point of No Return, GUARDIAN (May 11, 
2016, 4:11 PM), https://theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/11/worlds-car-
bon-dioxide-concentration-teetering-on-the-point-of-no-return. 
 8 Robert T. Watson, Chairman, Int’l Panel on Climate Change, Report to the 
Fifth Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (Nov. 2, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.ipcc.ch/
graphics/speeches/robert-watson-november-1999.pdf). 
 9 Most paleoanthropologists date the emergence of Homo sapiens to roughly 
200,000 years ago under the “out-of-Africa” theory. JOHN L. BRADSHAW, HUMAN 
EVOLUTION: A NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 185 (2003). Behaviorally 
modern humans, however, have a shorter history—roughly 60,000 years. Paul 
Mellars, Why Did Modern Human Populations Disperse from Africa ca. 60,000 
Years Ago? A New Model, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9381, 9381 (2006). 
 10 Chaffin Mitchell, It’s So Hot in Arizona that Street Signs and Mailboxes 
Are Melting, ACCU WEATHER (June 26, 2017 2:00 PM), https://www.ac-
cuweather.com/en/weather-news/its-so-hot-in-arizona-that-street-signs-and-
mailboxes-are-melting/70002032. 
2018] THE CLIMATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 311 
 
planes were grounded because it was “too hot to fly.”11 Around the 
world, glaciers are retreating at a rate “without precedent,”12 and the 
Antarctic ice shelves are disintegrating.13 In coastal zones, “sunny 
day flooding” is on the rise,14 and many coastal cities will be inun-
dated within the next twenty years.15 Biodiversity is teetering on the 
                                                                                                             
 11 Matt Falcus, Chaos in Arizona: What Happens When It’s Too Hot to Fly?, 
MULTIBRIEFS (June 27, 2017), http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/content/chaos-in-
arizona-what-happens-when-its-too-hot-to-fly/transportation-technology-autmo-
tive; Amy B. Wang, It’s So Hot in Phoenix that Airplanes Can’t Fly, WASH. POST 
(June 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/
wp/2017/06/20/its-so-hot-in-phoenix-that-airplanes-cant-fly/?utm_term=.
654236489206 (reporting that many regional jets can only operate out of Phoenix 
when the temperature is 118º F and below). For a detailed explanation of how 
excessive heat affects air travel, see Zach Wichter, Too Hot to Fly? Climate 
Change May Take a Toll on Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/business/flying-climate-change.html. Climate 
change could affect a significant percentage of flights by mid-century. See Ethan 
D. Coffel et al., The Impacts of Rising Temperatures on Aircraft Takeoff Perfor-
mance, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 381, 384–85 (2017), https://link.springer.com/
content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10584-017-2018-9.pdf. 
 12 WORLD GLACIER MONITORING SERV., GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGE 
BULLETIN: NO. 1 (2012–2013) 8 (Michael Zemp et al. eds., 2015); accord Marga-
ret Kriz Hobson, Alaska’s Glaciers Are Retreating, SCI. AM. (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/alaska-s-glaciers-are-retreating/. 
 13 See Jugal K. Patel & Justin Gillis, An Iceberg the Size of Delaware Just 
Broke Away from Antarctic, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2017/06/09/climate/antarctica-rift-update.html (last updated July 12, 2017); 
Justin Gillis, Antarctic Dispatches: Miles of Ice Collapsing into the Sea, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/18/cli-
mate/antarctica-ice-melt-climate-change.html. For decades, scientists have been 
warning of the catastrophic sea level rise associated with climate-change induced 
Antarctic melting. See, e.g., J. H. Mercer, West Antarctic Ice Sheets and CO2 
Greenhouse Effect: A Threat of Disaster, 271 NATURE 321, 321 (1978). 
 14 Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already 
Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/sci-
ence/flooding-of-coast-caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html. 
“Sunny day flooding” refers to tidal flooding due to rising sea levels. See Jonathan 
Corum, A Sharp Increase in ‘Sunny Day’ Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/04/science/global-warming-in-
creases-nuisance-flooding.html. 
 15 ERIKA SPANGER-SIEGFRIED ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
WHEN RISING SEAS HIT HOME: HARD CHOICES AHEAD FOR HUNDREDS OF US 
COASTAL COMMUNITIES 2, 16–19 (2017). 
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precipice of mass extinctions.16 Fifteen of the sixteen warmest years 
on record have occurred since 2001.17 The last time the world expe-
rienced a month with below average temperatures was February 
1985.18 
Scientists have conclusively documented the anthropogenic ori-
gins of climate change.19 Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) characterized the scientific evidence as “un-
equivocal.”20 It seems like the message is finally getting through. 
Global CO2 emissions recently stabilized after years of growth,
21 
and in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the largest carbon emitters, includ-
ing the United States, China, India, and the European Union, all col-
lectively endorsed the goal of keeping warming as close to 1.5ºC as 
possible.22 Advances in sustainable energy make a technology-
driven de-carbonization of the world economy increasingly possi-
ble.23 A low carbon future is potentially within our grasp.24 Yet, we 
                                                                                                             
 16 See Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 
NATURE 145, 145 (2004) (predicting that under mid-range climate-warming sce-
narios, 15–37% of species will be committed to extinction by 2050). 
 17 NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal Record-Shattering Global Warm Tempera-
tures in 2015, NASA (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.giss.nasa.gov/re-
search/news/20160120/. 
 18 NASA, GLOBAL Land-Ocean Temperature Index in 0.01 Degrees 
Celcius, https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/tabledata_v3/GLB.Ts+dSST.txt (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2018) (1880-present). Anyone under the age of 32 (as of this writ-
ing) has never lived through a single month with below average global tempera-
tures. 
 19 IPCC, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 20 Id. at 2. 
 21 Pilita Clark, Sharp Drop in US Emissions Keeps Global Levels Flat, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/540ebb0c-0a60-11e7-ac5a-
903b21361b43; IEA, RECENT TRENDS IN OECD: ENERGY AND CO2 EMISSIONS 6 
(2016), http://www.iea.org/media/statistics/Recent_Trends_in_the_OECD.pdf. 
 22 Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Jan. 7, 
2018); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of 
the Paris Agreement, art. 2, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, annex (Dec. 12, 
2015) [hereinafter Adoption of the Paris Agreement]. 
 23 Johan Rockström et al., A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 355 SCI. 
1269, 1269, 1271 (2017). 
 24 Id. 
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are rapidly approaching a tipping point for major, irreversible cli-
mate changes.25 The time for urgent action is now.26 
So, naturally, the new President of the United States decided to 
withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement27 and to vocally 
promote the use of coal and other fossil fuels.28 Climate deniers29 
and oil executives30 head key federal agencies in the Trump Admin-
istration, making it unlikely that there will be climate progress on 
                                                                                                             
 25 CHLOE REVILL ET AL., 2020: THE CLIMATE TURNING POINT 7 (2017), 
www.mission2020.global/2020%20The%20Climate%20Turning%20Point.pdf. 
 26 Id. (identifying six critical milestones to reach by 2020, including: zero 
emissions transport, renewable electricity generation, large-scale land restoration, 
infrastructure decarbonization, and massive investment in climate action). 
 27 Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agree-
ment, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/cli-
mate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html. 
 28 See Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life 
on U.S. Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.html; 
Alister Doyle, Trump’s Coal Plan Sends U.S. Energy “Back to the Past”, 
REUTERS (June 16, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cli-
matechange-vatican-idUSKBN197216. During the 2016 campaign, Trump re-
peatedly touted his willingness to promote coal mining, and in one of his first 
speeches after the election, promised to “cancel job-killing restrictions on the pro-
duction of American energy, including shale energy and clean coal, creating many 
millions of high-paying jobs.” Chris Mooney & Steven Mufson, Trump Wants to 




 29 Trump’s EPA is run by Scott Pruitt, who is on record stating that carbon 
dioxide does not cause global warming. Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott 
Pruitt Says Carbon Dioxide is Not a Primary Contributor to Global Warming, 
CNBC: POL., https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/epa-chief-scott-pruitt.html (last 
updated Mar. 10, 2017, 10:08 AM). Sadly, Pruitt is far from the only member of 
the Trump Administration with extreme views on climate change. For a full roster 
of the climate views of cabinet members, see Mazin Sidahmed, Climate Change 
Denial in the Trump Cabinet: Where Do His Nominees Stand?, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
15, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/15/
trump-cabinet-climate-change-deniers. 
 30 Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was CEO of ExxonMobil until December 
2016. In that role, he was accused of misleading shareholders about the costs of 
climate change. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Exxon’s Motion to Quash 
and in Support of the Office of the Attorney General’s Cross-Motion to Compel 
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the federal level. Despite the United States’ intransigence, the rest 
of the world continues moving forward. The G-19 (the G-20 minus 
the United States)31 very publicly recommitted itself to the Paris 
Agreement.32 Domestically, states, cities, and private actors have 
begun stepping forward to advance carbon reduction initiatives, 
even without national leadership.33 
Unfortunately, our existing legal frameworks make it difficult 
for even climate-conscious decision-makers to “see” climate change 
                                                                                                             
at 6–7, People of the State of N.Y. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 52 N.Y.S.3d 
626 (2017) (No. 17-168). 
 31 Sara Stefanini, G-19 Pledge to Stick to Paris Climate Agreement, 
POLITICO, http://www.politico.eu/article/g19-pledge-to-stick-to-paris-climate-
agreement/ (last updated July 8, 2017, 6:11 AM). 
 32 G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Shaping an Interconnected World, G20 Ger-
many 2017: Hamburg 10 (July 7–8, 2017), https://www.g20.org/gipfeldoku-
mente/G20-leaders-declaration.pdf (announcing that “[w]e take note of the deci-
sion of the United States of America to withdraw from the Paris Agreement . . . . 
The leaders of the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversi-
ble.”). 
 33 Hiroku Tabuchi & Lisa Friedman, U.S. Cities, States and Businesses 
Pledge to Measure Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/07/11/climate/cities-states-businesses-emissions-climate-
pact.html. The “We are Still” in declaration has already gathered carbon reduction 
commitments from 227 cities and counties, nine states, and thousands of busi-
nesses, investors, and educational institutions. “WE ARE STILL IN” DECLARATION, 
https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-declaration (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
My institution, the City University of New York (CUNY), is one of the signato-
ries. Id. America’s Pledge is an umbrella organization led by California Governor, 
Jerry Brown, and former New York City Mayor, Michael R. Bloomberg. For more 
information, see Letter of Michael R. Bloomberg to United Nations Secretary-
general António Guterres & Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change Patricia Espinosa, AMERICA’S PLEDGE, 
https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). At 
the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, held in late 2017, America’s Pledge submitted a report detailing the 
scope and scale of ongoing climate action in the United States that is occurring 
despite the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. See 
generally AMERICA’S PLEDGE, PHASE 1 REPORT: STATES, CITIES, AND 
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE STEPPING UP ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2017), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2017/11/AmericasPledgePhaseOn-
eReportWeb.pdf. 
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when approving projects, or making critical infrastructure, agricul-
tural, and land use decisions.34 For example, the National Environ-
mental Policy Act35 requires federal agencies to consider “cumula-
tive impacts,”36 including “indirect” environmental impacts that are 
“reasonably foreseeable.”37 Yet, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission does not consider the climate impacts of exported nat-
ural gas when approving new natural gas exporting facilities be-
cause a separate agency, the Department of Energy, actually issues 
the export approvals for the natural gas.38 The structure of the law, 
in this case the division of responsibilities between two interrelated 
federal agencies, renders invisible what should be clear—the inher-
ent relationship between a facility designed to increase carbon-in-
tensive fuel exports and the to-be-expected increases in natural gas 
production in order to supply that export facility with the natural gas 
it will export. This is just one small example39 of how environmental 
decision-making remains stuck in old, illogical cubbyholes, and the 
fragmented legal frameworks that support them, even as we trans-
gress multiple planetary boundaries.40 This Article suggests how hu-
                                                                                                             
 34 For a description of how variables become simplified and abstracted, and 
therefore “legible” to the state, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW 
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 25–39 
(1998). 
 35 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. 
(2012). 
 36 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2011). 
 37 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2011). 
 38 See EarthReports, Inc., v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see 
also Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra 
Club v. FERC (Sabine Pass), 827 F.3d 59, 62–63 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 39 See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 
4:14-cv-00029-RRB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34848, at *46–*47 (D. Alaska Mar. 
17, 2016). 
 40 The concept of planetary boundaries emerged from interdisciplinary re-
search at the Stockholm Resilience Center. See Johan Rockström et al., Planetary 
Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY & 
SOC’Y 32, 37–38 fig.4 (2009), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/
art32/ [hereinafter Planetary Boundaries] (identifying nine planetary boundaries: 
biodiversity loss, climate change, chemical pollution, stratospheric ozone, atmos-
pheric aerosol loading, ocean acidification, global phosphorus and nitrogen cy-
cles, freshwater use, and land use change). In 2015, this same team of researchers 
reported that nearly half of those boundaries had been crossed. Will Steffen et al., 
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man rights norms might help re-frame legal decision-making to bet-
ter integrate climate change and the entwined destiny of human be-
ings and Planet Earth. 
II. WICKED PROBLEMS, SUPER-WICKED PROBLEMS, AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
At the 1992 Rio Convention, the global community committed 
itself to “stabiliz[ing] [] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmos-
phere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system.”41 Yet, a quarter of a century later, 
we are nowhere near achieving that goal. Climate change is a classic 
example of what has come to be known as a “wicked” problem.42 
The term, coined by design theorist Horst Rittel, distinguishes a cer-
tain kind of problem from the “tame” or “benign” problems typically 
found in engineering or science.43 “Tame problems” have “rela-
tively well-defined and stable problem statement[s, as well as] a def-
inite stopping point” at which the problem has been answered.44 So-
lutions can then be tested against an objective standard and accepted 
or rejected accordingly. That is not to say that tame problems are 
simple; they can be extremely complex and challenging.45 But tame 
problems are amenable to the ordinary tools of analysis and verifi-
cation.46 
                                                                                                             
Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, 347 
SCI. 736, 736 (2015). 
 41 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. II, 
adopted May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [here-
after UNFCCC]. 
 42 See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate 
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV 
1153, 1159–87 (2009). 
 43 Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–61 (1973) (explaining that “wicked’ in this con-
text does not mean “ethically deplorable” but “tricky” or “vicious (like a circle).”). 
 44 Tom Ritchey, Wicked Problems: Modelling Social Messes with Morpho-
logical Analysis, 2 ACTA MORPHOLOGICA GENERALIS 1, 2 (2013). 
 45 See Joseph C. Bentley, From Wicked to Tame and Vice Versa, CHALLENGE 
TAMING WICKED PROBS. (June 2, 2017), http://tamingwickedprob-
lems.com/from-wicked-to-tame-and-vice-versa/. 
 46 See id.; Ritchey, supra note 44, at 2. 
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For wicked problems, by contrast, there is rarely agreement 
about how the problem should be stated, let alone how it should be 
resolved.47 Instead, wicked problems involve indeterminate prob-
lem-definitions, a plurality of perspectives held by multiple stake-
holders, and a range of possible solutions, which rely on elusive po-
litical judgments about how to best characterize the problem.48 In-
deed, it has been said that “every wicked problem can be considered 
to be a symptom of another problem.”49 
Climate change exhibits all of the attributes of a wicked prob-
lem. First, our understanding of how human activities impact the 
global climate system is constantly evolving, and new information 
is continually forcing revisions to the definition of the problem it-
self.50 Second, the climate problem is multi-causal: it not only in-
volves the current activities of billions of people across the globe as 
they engage in multiple forms of contributory conduct, but also the 
historical conduct of a much smaller subsection of that population 
stretching back for well over a century.51 Third, climate change in-
volves complex and unpredictable interactions between geophysi-
cal, political, social and economic systems, and involves those sys-
tems on global, regional, national, and local levels.52 Finally, climate 
change has more than one possible solution, with the appropriate-
ness of any given solution hinging largely on the perspective of the 
                                                                                                             
 47 See Ritchey, supra note 44, at 2. 
 48 See Rittel & Webber, supra note 43, at 160–63. 
 49 Id. at 165; Wicked Problems: Problems Worth Solving, AUSTIN CENTER 
FOR DESIGN, https://www.wickedproblems.com/1_wicked_problems.php (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2018). 
 50 But not that the problem exists. In 1999, the head of the IPCC was already 
cautioning “it is not a question of whether the Earth’s climate will change, but 
rather when, where and by how much.” Watson, supra note 8. 
 51 Calculating shares of responsibility is an uncertain process, but there is no 
question that the OECD are responsible for the lions share whether measured per 
capita or overall. See H. Damon Matthews et al., National Contributions to Ob-
served Global Warming, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 5, 5 tbl.2 (2014), http://iop-
science.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/1/014010/meta (noting that the 
United States alone accounts for roughly 15%, the top seven countries 63%, and 
the top twenty countries 82% of observed warming); Michal den Ezen et al., An-
alyzing Countries’ Contribution to Climate Change: Scientific and Policy-Related 
Choices, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL. 614, 614, 633 tbl.4, 634–35 (2005). 
 52 See, e.g., Anthony J. McMichael, Globalization, Climate Change, and Hu-
man Health, 368 N. ENG. J. MED. 1336, 1337–38 (2013). 
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decision-maker. For example, debates over adaptation to climate 
change versus mitigation of climate change are expressed through 
tussles over whether we should prioritize reducing carbon emis-
sions,53 promoting and protecting carbon sinks,54 managing retreat-
ing from vulnerable lands,55 or developing geoengineering technol-
ogies.56 These debates reveal more about the preferences and values 
of those advocating for each approach than about the inherent supe-
riority of one tactic or another. These debates highlight how the re-
percussions that flow from adopting any particular solution tend to 
create other problems,57 often other wicked problems, forcing a con-
tinual re-evaluation of the parameters to be used in decision-making 
about climate change.58 In short, wicked problems challenge the 
                                                                                                             
 53 See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions: Reduce Emissions, UNION OF 
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-warming/solu-
tions/global-warming-solutions-reduce-emissions (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). New 
York City, for example, has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions 
by 80% by 2050. New York City’s Roadmap to 80 x 50, NYC SUSTAINABILITY, 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/sustainability/downloads/pdf/publications/New%20
York%20City’s%20Roadmap%20to%2080%20x%2050_20160926_FOR%20W
EB.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
 54 See generally Amelia Ravin & Teresa Raine, Best Practices for Including 
Carbon Sinks in Greenhouse Gas Inventories, ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei16/session3/ravin.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 5, 2018); Roger A. Sedjo & Michael Toman, Can Carbon Sinks Be Opera-
tional? RFF Workshop Summary 1–2 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 
No. 01-26) http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-
01-26.pdf.   
 55 See Miyuki Hino et al., Managed Retreat as a Response to Natural Hazard 
Risk, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 364, 364 (2017). 
 56 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, 
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE 
SEQUESTRATION (2015); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, 
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH (2015). But see 
Clive Hamilton, Geoengineering is Not a Solution to Climate Change, SCI. AM. 
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/geoengineering-is-
not-a-solution-to-climate-change/. 
 57 See e.g., Megan Darby, Activists Row Over Bioenergy Role in Meeting 
1.5C Climate Target, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (May 20, 2016, 9:40 AM), 
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/05/20/activists-row-over-bioenergy-
role-in-meeting-1-5c-climate-target/. 
 58 Rittel & Webber, supra note 43, at 159. 
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core institutions of a society. They are never really solved; “at best 
they are re-solved—over and over again.”59 
However, as Yale Forestry Professor Ben Cashore pointed out, 
climate change is more than a wicked problem; it is what he calls 
“super-wicked.”60 Cashore identifies a set of additional confounding 
factors that distinguish super-wicked problems from wicked ones. 
First, for super-wicked problems, time is running out.61 Second, 
those who cause the problem are also those seeking to provide a so-
lution.62 Third, the central authority needed to address a super-
wicked problem is weak or non-existent.63 And finally, discounting 
techniques discourage even inexpensive present-day investments to 
avoid long-term impacts, thereby pushing responses far into the fu-
ture.64 Sadly, climate change meets all these criteria. 
A. Time is Running Out 
The window for action to avert a climate catastrophe is closing 
rapidly.65 Many consider the Paris Agreement goal of keeping 
warming below 1.5ºC to be already out of reach.66 In adopting 1.5ºC 
as its goal, the Paris Agreement took a step beyond what had been 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. at 159–60. 
 60 Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: 
Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 POL’Y 
SCI. 123, 124 (2012) [hereinafter Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Prob-
lems]; K. Levin et al., Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incre-
mentalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Climate Change, 6 IOP CONF. 
SERIES 1, 1–2 (2009), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1307/6/50/
502002/pdf. 
 61 Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at 127. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 127–28. 
 64 Id. at 128–29. 
 65 Time Window for Action to Limit Climate Change is Closing Rapidly, SCI. 
DAILY: SCI. NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/re-
leases/2016/09/160901125440.htm (reporting on an address by Professor Niklas 
Höhne, Special Professor of Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases at Waginenen Uni-
versity). 
 66 See Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost 
to Keep Warming Well Below 2ºC, 534 NATURE 631, 631 (2016); Megan Darby, 
Scientists: Window for Avoiding 1.5C Global Warming ‘Closed’, CLIMATE HOME 
NEWS (June 29, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/06/
29/scientists-window-for-avoiding-1-5c-global-warming-closed/. 
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the most frequently mentioned climate goal—keeping warming be-
low 2ºC.67 Two degrees Celsius had been widely adopted as a cli-
mate goal, not because it made sense from a perspective of keeping 
climate change within manageable bounds, but because it seemed 
achievable. A more honest assessment views this target for “suc-
cess” as in fact the threshold for catastrophe.68 And yet, we will be 
lucky if we can achieve 2ºC.69 The IPCC’s business-as-usual-trajec-
tory projects 2.6ºC to 4.8ºC by 2100,70 which would spell disaster. 
B. Global Political Paralysis 
We have decades of data, providing ever-increasing levels of 
certainty about the scope and scale of the climate disaster, yet so few 
of the necessary choices have been made. The reason for this paral-
ysis stems from Cashore’s second and third super-wicked fac-
tors71—the lack of governmental structure and the conundrum that 
those who are creating the problem must solve it. 
Even the Paris Agreement, the focus of so much political debate, 
does little to solve these core problems. The Paris Agreement is, af-
ter all, composed entirely of voluntarily-adopted “nationally deter-
mined contributions.”72 Each country decided for itself how ambi-
tious it would be.73 As a result, those “nationally determined contri-
butions” have more to do with short-term pragmatic domestic con-
cern than with the actual reductions necessary to avert a climate ca-
tastrophe.74 For example, the United States’ nationally determined 
                                                                                                             
 67 See Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631. 
 68 Stefan Rahmstorf & Anders Levermann, Preface to 2020: THE CLIMATE 
TURNING POINT, supra note 25, at 3. 
 69 Richard A. Betts et al., When Could Global Warming Reach 4ºC?, 369 
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 67, 67–70 (2010) (noting that the center of 
the range of projections from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report hovered 
around 4ºC.). 
 70 Some researchers project even higher temperature rises of 4.78ºC to 
7.36ºC. Tobias Friedrich et al., Nonlinear Climate Sensitivity and Its Implications 
for Future Greenhouse Warming, SCI. ADVANCES, Nov. 9, 2016, at 1, 3, 9. 
 71 See Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at 
127–28. 
 72 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 4. 
 73 Id. at art. 4. 
 74 Id.; see also Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631. See generally Iñigo Gon-
zález-Ricoy & Axel Gosseries, Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An 
Introduction, in INSTITUTIONS FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 3, 4 (Iñigo González-
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contribution was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26% to 
28% below 2005 levels by 2025.75 The Presidential Climate Action 
Project identified as necessary a much more ambitious target—re-
ducing United States’ emissions by 80% by 2050.76 While the 
United States’ Paris commitment could have been a first step toward 
reaching that more ambitious target, independent analysis of the 
United States’ submissions concluded that the country’s likelihood 
of reaching that goal under existing law was small.77 And that was 
before the 2016 election placed a climate-denier at the helm. 
Even if the United States, and the other 146 states that submitted 
nationally determined contributions, succeeded in meeting those tar-
gets, best estimates are that the resulting emissions would put us on 
target for 2.6 to 3.1ºC of warming.78 Moreover, since each country 
self-assesses its own success in meeting its nationally-determined 
contributions under the Paris Agreement,79 there is no enforcement 
mechanism, aside from the requirement of transparency.80 The Paris 
Agreement may have been a good start, but it is at most only a be-
ginning. And now, of course, the future of the Paris Agreement is 
unclear. 
C. Irrational Discounting 
By adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), the international community set its sights 
                                                                                                             
Ricoy & Axel Gosseries eds., 2017) (ebook); William D. Nordhaus, The Political 
Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 181–89 (1975). 
 75 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S. Re-
ports Its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT 
BARACK OBAMA (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc. 
 76 SUSAN JOY HASSOL, PRESIDENTIAL CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EMISSIONS NEEDED TO STABILIZE CLIMATE 4 (2007), 
https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/presiden-
tialaction.pdf. 
 77 See Jeffrey B. Greenblatt & Max Wei, Assessment of the Climate Commit-
ments and Additional Mitigation Policies of the United States, 6 NATURE 
CLIMATE CHANGE 1090, 1090–91 (2016). 
 78 Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631, 635; Climate Scoreboard: UN Climate 
Pledge Analysis, CLIMATE INTERACTIVE, https://www.climateinteractive.org/pro-
grams/scoreboard/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) (projecting 3.3°C warming by 2100). 
 79 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 4, art. 13. 
 80 Id. at art. 13. 
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on preventing “dangerous anthropogenic” climate change.81 In Ar-
ticle 3(3), the UNFCCC directed the Parties to “take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate 
change and mitigate its adverse effects.”82 It then tried to bridge the 
gap between pure cost-justified regulation and pure precaution by 
adding that 
[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing such measures, tak-
ing into account that policies and measures to deal 
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to 
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.83 
Irrational discounting, Cashore’s fourth super-wicked factor, has 
hollowed out this language. 84 
Discounting is a core concept in benefit-cost analysis.85 Ever 
since President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,86 benefit-
cost analysis has been gaining ascendancy in administrative deci-
sion-making and today it is the predominant administrative deci-
sion-making tool in the United States.87 In theory, benefit-cost anal-
ysis gives decision-makers a consistent metric for making choices.88 
                                                                                                             
 81 UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. II. 
 82 Id. at art. III(3). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at 
128–29. For a good explanation of hyperbolic discounting, see Partha Dasgupta, 
Discounting Climate Change 18–19 (SANDEE, Working Paper No. 33-08). 
 85 See William Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review and the Economics 
of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686, 689 (2007). 
 86 Section 2(b) of this Executive Order provides: “[r]egulatory action shall 
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation out-
weigh the potential costs to society.” Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193, 
§ 2(b) (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 87 The current version of this requirement, in Section 1(b)(6) of Executive 
Order 12,866 first issued by President Clinton, shifted the baseline a bit by in-
structing that “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the 
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to 
quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that 
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
58 Fed. Reg. 51735, § 1(b)(6) (Oct. 4, 1993). 
 88 See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, MINDTOOLS, https://www.mindtools.com/
pages/article/newTED_08.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). 
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By converting all costs and benefits of a proposed action into mon-
etary values, regulators purport to assess the economic efficiency of 
the action.89 However, in the context of climate change, the metric 
offered by benefit-cost analysis is woefully inadequate. First, at-
tempts to measure the costs of climate change generally only capture 
a small portion of the impacts90—those costs that directly impact 
economic production, or create non-market impacts that can be ex-
pressed in monetary terms. But, this is a vastly incomplete represen-
tation of the “costs” flowing from climate change.91 
Decision-makers can assign a value to human lives lost (always 
a controversial, value-laden task), but what about the disruption to 
communities?92 How exactly does one put a value on Tuvalu?93 
Moreover, the impacts of climate change are so wide-ranging and so 
potentially catastrophic that it borders on the absurd to reduce them 
to some number presuming to approximate market value. What cost 
should be assigned to the spread of disease associated with climate 
change? Lost wages, medical costs, and price-per-capita for mortal-
ity capture only the narrowest slice of what that will really cost a 
society. Nor can sea-level rise, hurricane intensification,94 ocean 
                                                                                                             
 89 Cf. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE 
OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 59 (2008). 
 90 See Nordhaus, supra note 85, at 692. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999). 
 93 Indeed, the very notion of a price begs another question—should that price 
be the amount we would be willing to pay to maintain Tuvalu, or the compensa-
tion we would demand for its elimination? (And of course, the notion of which 
“we” would make that choice is highly problematic.) The wide discrepancy be-
tween the values that people are willing to pay to achieve or prevent an outcome 
as opposed to what level of compensation they would demand to accept that same 
outcome highlights the core indeterminacy at the heart of this kind of an analysis. 
See generally Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compen-
sation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Meas-
ure of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (noting the wide discrepancy between 
compensation demanded and willingness to pay); Richard Thaler, Towards a Pos-
itive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 39–40 (1980). 
Yet, too often the very act of assigning dollar figures obscures this core indeter-
minacy with a patina of certainty and objectivity. 
 94 Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, for example, caused over $100 billion 
in damage, in addition to loss of over 1,800 lives. Hurricane Katrina Statistics 
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acidification, and loss of biodiversity, which are among the most 
damaging aspects of climate change, be translated into a conven-
tional marketplace analysis. 
These profound caveats and uncertainties have not prevented 
economists from attempting to identify the social cost of carbon—a 
figure translating the future consequences flowing from climate 
change into present monetary values.95 There are three different, 
widely-used models for estimating the monetized damages from cli-
mate change.96 The models begin to diverge at 1.5ºC change to 
global mean temperature, and the gaps between the models increase 
dramatically as changes to global mean temperature become more 
catastrophic.97 The divergence between these models adds yet an-
other layer of uncertainty. 
                                                                                                             
Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statis-
tics-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2017, 6:10 PM). Hurricane 
Sandy, in 2012, caused about $50 billion in damages, disrupting power to nearly 
5 million customers and leaving lasting effects on an extensive area of shoreline 
in New York and New Jersey. Mary Williams Walsh & Nelson D. Schwartz, Es-
timate of Economic Losses Now Up to $50 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/estimate-of-economic-losses-
now-up-to-50-billion.html; Hurricane Sandy’s Cost May Hit $50 Billion; Re-
building to Ease Blow, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2012, 2:06 PM), https://www.polit-
ico.com/story/2012/10/hurricane-sandys-cost-may-hit-50-billion-rebuilding-to-
ease-blow-083062. If climate change causes hurricanes to be more frequent, ben-
efit-cost analysis would have to dramatically increase the costs of destruction. 
 95 The United States government decided that value was $37 per ton of carbon 
emitted in 2015. Howard Shelanski, Refining Estimates of the Social Cost of Car-
bon, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013, 4:02 PM), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/11/01/refining-estimates-so-
cial-cost-carbon. However, depending on the discount rate, the span of possible 
values ranged from $12 to $123, an increase from three years earlier when the 
estimate range had been between $7 and $81. INTERAGENCY GRP. ON SOC. COST 
OF GREENHOUSE GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: 
TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 5 fig.ES-1 (2013). 
 96 Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of 
Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173, 173 (2014), http://www.nature.com/news/
global-warmingimprove-economic-models-of-climate-change-1.14991. 
 97 Id. at 173–74. 
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Second, climate change “stretch[es] social and natural relations 
of cause, effect and responsibility” in new ways.98 Most of the ben-
efits of climate regulation accrue in the future, often the distant fu-
ture, and contributory actions date back to the 18th Century. The 
costs, by contrast, are incurred today, and in the near-future. Policy-
makers conducting a benefit-cost analysis thus rely on discounting 
to convert the dollar value of those future benefits into their present 
value.99 The implicit value judgments associated with discounting100 
add yet another layer of uncertainty to this calculation.101 Simply by 
using different discount rates for those future dollars, policy-makers 
can reach widely divergent conclusions justifying diametrically op-
posed regulatory choices. A high discount rate means that those fu-
ture benefits have little present value,102 and expending resources 
                                                                                                             
 98 Harriet Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change: The Politics of Risk Soci-
ety?, 26 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 430, 432 (2001). See also, 
Matthew Gandy, Rethinking the Ecological Leviathan: Environmental Regulation 
in the Age of Risk, 9 Global Environmental Change 59, 59-60 (1999) (making the 
point that conventional risk assessment is ill-suited for new, more systemic risks 
like climate change.) For one thing, there is no way to narrow the class of stake-
holders for decisions that will affect everyone on the globe and all future genera-
tions. 
 99 This approach is rooted in financial markets. See Nordhaus, supra note 85, 
at 689. It rests on the assumption that all human behavior can be appropriately 
modeled as selections among preferences that can be reduced to dollar values for 
purpose of comparison. See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 88; cf. 
NORDHAUS, supra note 89, at 59. While this approach has clear utility under cer-
tain circumstances, the absurdity of reducing the “preference” for having a climate 
that supports human life should be apparent on its face. 
 100 See Douglas A. Kysar, Commentary, Politics by Other Meanings: A Com-
ment on “Retaking Rationality Two Years Later”, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011) 
(pointing out that benefit-cost analyses “inevitably [ ] contain moments deep 
within their technical details in which the analyst masks a critical value choice 
through a methodological maneuver.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cli-
mate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 
1560–62, 1568, 1596–1599 (2011). 
 101 Conducting this analysis requires bridging three levels of uncertainty: the 
profoundly practical uncertainty about the specific impacts of climate change; the 
existential uncertainty about how to value those impacts in dollar terms; and the 
value-laden uncertainty about how to compare costs and benefits that accrue at 
different times. It is easy to see how the assumptions used to bridge these com-
pounding uncertainties can become outcome determinative. 
 102 See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S3355–56 (daily ed. June 3, 2014) (statement of 
Sen. Cornyn) (“[T]he debate . . . is not about the science of climate change; it is a 
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today to accrue climate benefits in the future will appear unjustifia-
ble.103 By contrast, employing a lower discount rate leads to a con-
clusion that “prompt and strong action” to prevent climate change is 
“clearly warranted.” 104 The discount rate becomes outcome deter-
minative. The central difference turns on how much to value the fu-
ture—and future generations.105 
Recognizing that climate change is a super-wicked problem with 
these four attributes is a first step toward developing responses. The 
essence of a super-wicked problem is that it defies ordinary solu-
tions rooted in the ordinary institutions of society.106 Climate change 
certainly qualifies. And, as if that were not enough of a challenge, 
there is an additional complicating factor: the overwhelming major-
ity of the conduct that has gotten us to this point has been entirely 
                                                                                                             
debate about whether massive regulations should be forced to pass a simple cost-
benefit analysis.”); 160 CONG. REC. H1654 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2014) (statement of 
Rep. Latta) (“[T]he EPA has put forward broad-reaching regulatory proposals that 
are either unachievable or lack sufficient cost-benefit justifications.”). 
 103 See NORDHAUS, supra note 89, at 10–11, 59–62; Nordhaus, supra note 85, 
at 689; see also TED GAYER & W. KIP VISCUSI, DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS 15–17 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/04_determining_proper_scope_climate_change_bene-
fits.pdf (objecting to considering global rather than national benefits in conduct-
ing a benefit-cost analysis of the Clean Power Plan, proposed by the Obama Ad-
ministration to reduce carbon emissions from power plants under the Clean Air 
Act). 
 104 NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE 671 (2007). The Stern Review estimated that the costs and risks associ-
ated with not taking action to combat climate change “will be equivalent to losing 
at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks 
and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of 
GDP or more.” Id. at xv. Presenting the Stern Review, then-British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair asserted “[w]ithout radical international measures to reduce carbon 
emissions within the next 10–15 years, there is compelling evidence to suggest 
we might lose the chance to control temperature rises.” Nigel Williams, Costing 
Climate Change, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY R971, R971–72 (2006). 
 105 Cf. David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting 
the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 436 (2009) 
(pointing out that “[t]he destruction of Florida through sea level rise in 200 
years . . . matters very little in a cost-benefit analysis that relies on discounting.”). 
 106 See generally Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra 
note 60. 
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legal.107 Thus, responding to a super-wicked problem like climate 
change requires rethinking the social institution of law—specifically 
the balance that law strikes between individual and group rights, be-
tween current and future interests, and between economic and envi-
ronmental priorities. That is where human rights come in. 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
If ordinary people are asked to fill in the blank in this sentence: 
“Climate change is the greatest ________ challenge that human so-
ciety faces in the 21st Century,” they might offer a range of different 
responses. Maybe the answer would be that climate change is the 
greatest technical challenge human society faces. Or, maybe that 
climate change poses the greatest social challenge, the greatest po-
litical challenge, or the greatest economic challenge. All of those 
answers may be true. But, climate change is also the greatest human 
rights challenge of the twenty-first century because a safe, clean, 
healthy, and sustainable environment is integral to the full enjoy-
ment of human rights,108 and climate change “has clear and imme-
diate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.”109 
Climate change has impacted or will impact a wide range of hu-
man rights by undercutting the rights to life, health, food, and water. 
For citizens of small island states, climate change will affect the 
right to self-determination and the right to culture. The preamble to 
the Paris Agreement recognized this relationship: 
Acknowledging that climate change is a common 
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking 
action to address climate change, respect, promote 
and consider their respective obligations on human 
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous 
                                                                                                             
 107 For a discussion on this point, see generally Rebecca Bratspies, Claimed 
Not Granted: Finding a Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 26 TRANSNAT’L 
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2017). 
 108 See generally John Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the 
Environment), Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the En-
joyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/34/49 (Jan. 19, 2017). 
 109 Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change 2 
(Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf. 
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peoples, local communities, migrants, children, per-
sons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situa-
tions and the right to development, as well as gender 
equality, empowerment of women and intergenera-
tional equity . . . 110 
This language, which marked the first time that an international 
climate treaty mentioned human rights, was the culmination of a 
multi-year advocacy project to “include” human rights in the climate 
agreement.111 The Paris Agreement thus took a much heralded step 
beyond the Cancun Agreement, which had called on Parties to “fully 
respect human rights” in all climate change matters.112 The Paris 
Agreement also built on the Human Rights Council’s conclusions 
that “climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to 
people and communities around the world”113 and that climate 
change has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights. 114 
But, it is not just that climate change poses a threat to human rights. 
Because climate change is a super-wicked problem, human rights 
                                                                                                             
 110 Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at 21. 
 111 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, A New 
Climate Agreement Must Include Human Rights Protections for All: An Open 
Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to 
the State Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change on the 
Occasion of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action in Bonn (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/SP/SP_To_UNFCCC.pdf. 
 112 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Confer-
ence of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 Nov. to 10 
Dec. 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011). I have written 
elsewhere about the absurdity in thinking that this legal wrangling actually deter-
mines the content of human rights. Bratspies, supra note 107, 272–73. 
 113 Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, at 1 (Mar. 28, 2008). 
 114 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7, 89–92, 95–96, 99, 114, 117 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Weeramantry, 
J.) (asserting that “protection of the environment is . . . a sine qua non for numer-
ous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself.”). In its 
primer on Human Rights and the Environment, The Center for International En-
vironmental Law helpfully provides a chart connecting various climate impacts 
with their human rights correlates. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, CLIMATE 
CHANGE & HUMAN RIGHTS: A PRIMER 6 (2011), http://www.ciel.org/Publica-
tions/CC_HRE_23May11.pdf. 
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can also be part of the solution—offering a theoretical framework to 
move law and policy forward in responding to climate change.115 
IV. WHY HUMAN RIGHTS? 
In the twenty-first century, human rights are almost reflexively 
considered to be jus cogens.116 They “enjoy a prima facie, presump-
tive inviolability, and will often ‘trump’117 other public goods.”118 
Human rights, after all, exist and bind states, regardless of state law 
to the contrary. Their entire purpose is to define a core of rights that 
are not dependent on favorable state laws.119 Moreover, while hu-
man rights flow to individuals120 (and sometimes groups), the state 
obligations involved are both horizontal and vertical, meaning that 
                                                                                                             
 115 See Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2009) (“[H]uman 
rights obligations and commitments have the potential to inform and strengthen 
international and national policymaking in the area of climate change . . . .”). 
 116 See Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 491, 498 (2008) (noting that courts evaluating anti-terrorism Security 
Council resolutions have considered human rights to be preemptory norms against 
which the Security Council resolutions must be evaluated). 
 117 No pun intended. 
 118 LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 4 (1990). The International Court of 
Justice has not embraced this view, at least with regard to the principle that the 
court’s jurisdiction rests on consent. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 60, ¶ 3 (sep-
arate opinion by ad hoc Dugard, J.). 
 119 The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights identifies rights 
for which states cannot make reservations. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, CORE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWO COVENANTS (2013), 
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Page%20Documents/Core%20Hu
man%20Rights.pdf. Countless scholars have described various human rights as 
non-derogable. See, e.g., RACHEL BALL, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE, 
ABSOLUTE AND NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–2 (2011). 
Even the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
identifies quite a few human rights norms as having attained peremptory status. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
 120 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world . . . .”). 
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states owe these erga omnes duties not only to persons within their 
control, but also to other states.121 
As such, human rights offer a means for navigating the nether-
regions of law—those areas where labels like “legal” and “illegal” 
fail to capture the full ramifications of social choices. With regards 
to climate change, a human rights framing can be a way to break out 
of the path dependencies created by routine regulatory decisions that 
“lock in” carbon emissions.122 Indeed, what gives human rights their 
power in this context is this ability to cut through business-as-usual 
decision-making under existing domestic law. The jus cogens and 
erga omnes nature of human rights creates this power—providing 
both the lever and the metaphorical “place to stand” that Archimedes 
sought in order to move the world.123 It is because of this ability to 
infuse ordinary, routine decision-making with new values that hu-
man rights have been called “law’s best response to profound, un-
thinkable, far-reaching moral transgression.”124 This characteriza-
tion has particular resonance in the climate context because the plan-
etary boundary we humans are most rapidly transgressing is the cli-
mate boundary.125 
By helping frame responses targeting the super-wicked aspects 
of climate change identified above, human rights can provide that 
world-moving “place to stand.” First, the urgency of human rights 
allows legal systems to respond in a rapid timeframe,126 creating the 
capability of responding to the “time is running out” aspect of the 
climate crisis. Second, because of the urgency and universality as-
sociated with human rights, recognizing climate change as a human 
                                                                                                             
 121 See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. 
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5). 
 122 See generally Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra 
note 60, at 134–35; Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 
ENERGY POL’Y 817 (2000). 
 123 See 1 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 418 
(Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden trans. 1992); Gary Berkowitz, trans., 
Tzetzes, Chiliades II, THEOI TEXTS LIBRARY, http://www.theoi.com/Text/
TzetzesChiliades2.html#3 (last visited Jan. 6, 2018). 
 124 Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 255, 257 (2007). 
 125 See generally Planetary Boundaries, supra note 40, at 32–33, 38–41. 
 126 See Responding to Pressing Human Rights Issues, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
OFFICE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/Respondingtopressinghrissues.aspx. 
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rights problem can reduce the clamor from competing economic and 
social interests, allowing policymakers to focus on responding to 
climate threats. Moreover, because human rights squarely reject the 
notion that national boundaries have salience with respect to ques-
tions of justice,127 a human rights framing responds both to the lack 
of governing political authority aspect of the climate crisis and to 
the discounting problems highlighted above. 
Among the key advantages to invoking human rights in the con-
text of climate change is that a human rights framing may make the 
problems more tractable (or if you prefer, less wicked). First, artic-
ulating the problems of climate change in the language of human 
rights allows policymakers to break out of the legal and technical 
lock-ins created by past decisions. In other words, human rights can 
create the space necessary for legal decision-makers to reinterpret 
domestic law to meet climate challenges. Second, to the extent that 
human rights are justiciable in international tribunals, new legal are-
nas allow citizens to assert their rights in a fashion that can reframe 
the problem of climate change, and to raise arguments and consid-
erations not possible in the domestic context.128 Human rights can 
thus spur action from those at opposite ends of the climate change 
conundrum; policy-makers have space to rethink their mission and 
an empowered citizenry has a venue to raise new questions. These 
two advantages can feed into each other, creating a new relationship 
between regulators and the citizenry they serve that in turn makes 
possible a rethinking of social order more generally. 
A. Breaking Domestic Boundaries 
This first advantage of human rights framing is its potentially-
transformative impact on those charged with making key regulatory 
decisions with climate impacts. When decision-makers view them-
selves as human rights actors, their self-conception of their duties 
                                                                                                             
 127 See e.g., Debra Satz, Equality of What Among Whom? Thoughts on Cos-
mopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism¸ 41 NOMOS 67, 74 (1999) (espousing this 
vision of human rights). 
 128 See Jeannine Cahill-Jackson, Note, Mossville Environmental Action Now 
v. United States: Is a Solution of Environmental Injustice Unfolding?, 6 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 173, 174 (2012). 
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and obligations necessarily shifts.129 For example, as noted above, 
in approving natural gas and oil pipelines, the Federal Energy Reg-
ulatory Commission (FERC) has routinely refused to consider cli-
mate change impacts from the natural gas transported by the pipe-
line, on the rationale that “there is no standard methodology for 
quantifying the downstream environmental effects of greenhouse 
gas emissions that result from a pipeline project.”130 The FERC 
maintained this position even when contracts for the sale of that gas 
are already in place131 and emissions can be predicted with great 
specificity. 
By statute, the FERC is tasked with making decisions in the pub-
lic’s interest.132 In interpreting this public interest mandate, the 
agency has “wide discretion to balance competing equities.”133 
Were the FERC to view itself as a human rights decision-maker, 
using that discretion would entail acknowledging the inextricably 
entwined relationship between energy production, carbon emis-
sions, climate change, and the enjoyment of human rights. 
Recognizing these connections would, in turn, mean that during 
the pipeline approval process, FERC would take seriously NEPA’s 
direction that all federal agencies shall “recognize the worldwide 
                                                                                                             
 129 I have elsewhere written about how this might work. See generally Re-
becca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and Environmental Regulation, 19 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 225 (2012). 
 130 Brief for the Respondent at 22, Freeport, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(Nos. 16-1329). 
 131 Opening Brief for the Petitioner at 36–37, Freeport, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-1329); Ellen M. Gilmer, FERC’s Environmental Justice, Climate 
Review Scrutinized, E&E NEWS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/sto-
ries/1060053253. 
 132 See e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2005) (“[i]t is declared that the business of 
transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is 
affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation . . . is necessary in the 
public interest . . . .”); id. at. § 824b(b) (“[t]he Commission may grant any appli-
cation for an order under this section . . . upon such terms and conditions as it 
finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and 
the coordination in the public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission.”); id. at § 824o(d)(2) (“[t]he Commission may approve, by rule or 
order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it 
determines that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or pref-
erential, and in the public interest.”). 
 133 Columbia Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 750 F.2d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
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and long-range character of environmental problems . . . .”134 More-
over, such an approach would breathe new life into the regulatory 
obligation that the FERC consider cumulative impacts135 of any pro-
posed pipeline projects136 by directing agency attention to the cumu-
lative impacts of carbon emissions from pipeline related activities 
on the human rights inter alia to life, water, and family. Thus, such 
an approach would help the FERC appreciate that its regulatory 
mandate is potentially much broader than its current interpretations 
allow. Against the backdrop of the relationship between human 
rights and climate change, the agency’s consideration of a pipeline’s 
impact “when added to [] past, present, and reasonably foreseeable 
future actions”137 would necessarily include consideration of the 
emissions associated with increased extraction of the natural gas that 
the pipeline is designed to transport and the transportation of that 
gas, as well as the consumption of that gas with its attendant carbon 
emissions. 
A human rights-oriented decision-making process would also 
create a space to consider the environmental justice issues associ-
ated with siting and building pipelines—a social issue within the 
purview of the agency. As an independent federal agency, the FERC 
is not bound by Executive Order 12,898,138 which directs regulatory 
agencies to consider environmental justice and ensure that their en-
vironmental activities do not exclude or discriminate against persons 
or populations “because of their race, color, or national origin.”139 
                                                                                                             
 134 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(F) (2012). 
 135 The Council on Environmental Quality has defined cumulative impacts as 
“the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the 
action [being studied] when added to other past, present, and reasonably foresee-
able future actions . . . . Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor 
but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.7 (2012). 
 136 See, e.g., 1 OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARATION 4-3 (2017) 
(identifying this inquiry as a “key principle” of the environmental assessment pro-
cess). 
 137 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. 
 138 City of Tacoma, Wash., 89 F.E.R.C. 61,275, 61,800 n. 8 (1999), 1999 
FERC LEXIS 2617 (noting that the executive order applies, by its terms, only to 
executive agencies, and excludes independent agencies like the FERC). 
 139 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, § 2–2 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
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Currently, the FERC has blinded itself to environmental justice con-
cerns associated with pipeline siting.140 For example, the FERC re-
cently defended its refusal to consider disproportionate impacts of a 
proposed pipeline, even after acknowledging that nearly 84% of the 
proposed pipeline would be located near environmental justice com-
munities.141 To justify this refusal, the FERC relied on census tract 
data, even though census tracts are often too large to paint an accu-
rate portrait of which communities live in actual proximity to the 
pipeline.142 The dangers of relying on census tract data in this con-
text are well known. Indeed, the EPA’s Environmental Justice Guid-
ance specifically cautions that census tract information needs to be 
buttressed with more granular information because “pockets of mi-
nority or low-income communities, including those that may be ex-
periencing disproportionately high and adverse effects, may be 
missed in a traditional census tract-based analysis.”143 
Were the agency to view itself as a human rights decision-
maker, the FERC would view protecting minority and indigenous 
populations as integral to its functioning. Such an approach would 
reorient and broaden the agency’s consideration of pipeline impacts 
on those communities. Rather than directing that the socioeconomic 
impacts of a facility be considered “using administrative boundaries 
[(i.e. census data)],”144 an approach that unquestionably misses 
                                                                                                             
 140 By contrast, the Department of Energy has identified environmental justice 
as a priority. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/LM-1460, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE STRATEGY 5 (2008) (identifying as a goal the “[e]nhanc[ement] [of] pro-
cedures to detect and mitigate potential disproportionately high and adverse hu-
man health or environmental effects of the Department’s programs, policies, and 
activities and to promote nondiscrimination among various population seg-
ments.”). 
 141 Brief for Respondent, supra note 130, at 51. 
 142 Id.; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS INTO EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 
§ 2.1.1 (Apr. 1998). 
 143 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 142, at § 2.1.1 (pointing out “the pos-
sibility of distortion of population breakdowns” and urging that “[i]n addition to 
identifying the proportion of the population of individual census tracts that are 
composed of minority individuals, analysts should attempt to identify whether 
high concentration ‘pockets’ of minority populations are evidenced in specific 
geographic areas.”). 
 144 OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, supra note 136, at 4-9. 
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many environmental justice concerns,145 the agency would find 
ways to obtain a more fine-grained description of the specific com-
munity impacted. Such an approach would illuminate rather than 
obscure the impacts on minority and indigenous communities. For 
example, regarding the controversial Keystone and Dakota Access 
Pipelines, the FERC would have viewed itself as bound by the UN 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples146 to ensure prior 
informed consent before crossing sacred Sioux ancestral lands.147 
And, a regulator acting as a human rights decision-maker would use 
the authority to regulate in the public’s interest to take the steps nec-
essary to ameliorate undue burdens on those communities. 
Finally, adopting a human rights approach would transform how 
the agency approached public participation in its decision-making. 
Among the advantages of a human rights approach to participation 
in environmental decision-making are increases in transparency,148 
proactive efforts to facilitate participation by the poorest and most 
marginalized groups, democratized agenda-setting and priority-set-
ting, and the potential that decision-making will create new under-
standings of community, and identify new possibilities for social 
justice. 
For example, the right of access to information and the right of 
access to courts to remedy violations of human rights have become 
well-established as components of the right of participation in inter-
national law. Viewing agency obligations through a human rights 
lens would incorporate international-law thinking on these topics 
into statutes like the Administrative Procedures Act,149 the Freedom 
                                                                                                             
 145 See Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Introduction to RACE AND THE 
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 1, 3–5 (Bun-
yan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992). 
 146 See generally G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
 147 See id. at art. 19. 
 148 For example, by making information about and proposed actions accessi-
ble (including minority languages and formats for persons with disabilities). 
 149 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency 
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without oppor-
tunity for oral presentation.”) (emphasis added). 
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of Information Act,150 the National Environmental Policy Act,151 
and the Energy Policy Act152 to name only a few. These statutes re-
quire that agencies ensure reasonable and adequate opportunities for 
public engagement with environmental decision-making. Were the 
agencies staffed with administrators who viewed themselves as hu-
man rights decision-makers, their sense of what constitutes “reason-
able” and “adequate” opportunities to participate would be much 
more capacious. 
B. Reframing the Problem 
The second advantage of human rights framing is that it offers 
an alternative forum—thereby creating a space for examining ques-
tions that are obscured by the structures of domestic law.153 
As Gerald Torres points out, using international tribunals to 
challenge national legal processes can facilitate a normative critique 
of how power is exercised domestically.154 The very act of translat-
ing a domestic legal decision into international law often reframes 
the issues in a fashion that highlights previously hidden aspects of 
the problem at issue;155 or, to use the language of anthropology, it 
makes the question legible to the State.156 Once these questions have 
become legible, new forms of advocacy become possible.157 From 
its very inception, the international community recognized this 
transformative potential as part of the “progressive[] . . . realization 
of [] rights.”158 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights explained: 
                                                                                                             
 150 Agencies shall ensure the public has adequate access to government infor-
mation. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
 151 Agencies shall ensure that environmental information is made available to 
the public before decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 4321(b) (2012). 
 152 Agency shall afford interested persons a reasonable opportunity to present 
their views. 42 U.S.C. § 16421a(b)(4) (2012). 
 153 See Gerald Torres, Translating Climate Change, 13 N.Z.J. PUB. AND INT’L 
L. 137, 146–47 (2015). 
 154 See id. 
 155 See id. at 145–47. 
 156 Cf. SCOTT, supra note 34, at 25–39 (discussing the unification and simpli-
fication of local, rural forms of measurement so that such usage would be legible 
to the state). 
 157 See Torres, supra note 153, at 146–47. 
 158 E.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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the fact that realization over time, or in other words 
progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should 
not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of 
all meaningful content . . . . [Progressive realization] 
imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards that goal.159 
The plight of Mossville, Louisiana is an example on point. The 
citizens of Mossville have spent decades seeking relief from the dis-
proportionate pollution loads their town has been burdened with, 
which amounts to racial discrimination.160 The facts are compelling. 
Mossville is located in Calcasieu Parish, which is roughly 1,094 
square miles and home to approximately 74,000 households.161 
Mossville is a tiny dot in the Parish—encompassing just five square 
miles and 342 households.162 Yet, tiny Mossville is home to fourteen 
industrial facilities that release millions of pounds of toxic chemi-
cals each year.163 Mossville’s residents are predominantly African-
American, and the town has been in existence since the late 1700s.164 
                                                                                                             
 159 International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), at 9 (May 27, 2008). 
 160 See Second Amended Petition and Petitioner’s Observations on the Gov-
ernment’s Reply Concerning the U.S. Government’s Failure to Protect the Human 
Rights of the Residents of Mossville, Louisiana, United States of America, Moss-
ville Environmental Action Now et al., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Petition No. P-
242-05), 1–9 (June 23, 2008), http://www.ehumanrights.org/docs/Mossville_
Amended_Petition_and_Observations_on_US_2008.pdf [hereinafter Mossville 
Environmental Action Now et al.]. 
 161 Id. at 1; Demographics, CALCASIEU PARISH, http://www.cppj.net/govern-
ment/demographics (last visited Jan. 7, 2018); Current Calcasieu Parish, Louisi-
ana Population, Demographics and Stats in 2016, 2017, SUBURBAN STATS, 
https://suburbanstats.org/population/louisiana/how-many-people-live-in-cal-
casieu-parish (last visited Jan 7, 2018). 
 162 Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 1. 
 163 Id. at 2. The Mossville based companies required to report toxic releases 
to the EPA include: Air Liquide; Arch Chemical; Biolab; Certainteed; Conoco 
Lake Charles Refinery; Entergy Roy S. Nelson Power Plant; Georgia Gulf; Tes-
senderlo Kerley Chemicals; Lyondell Chemical; Olin; PPG Industries; Sasol; 
Tetra Chemicals. Id. at 2–3 n.5–6. 
 164 Id. at 1. 
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By contrast, the Parish overall is about 70% white.165 While the Par-
ish overall has a healthy environment, Mossville does not. The air 
and water in Mossville are affected by the disproportionate indus-
trial sitings, and the health consequences for the residents of Moss-
ville have been severe.166 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to correct the scourge 
of racial discrimination.167 To that end, Title VI prohibits govern-
ment funding of racially discriminatory activities. Section 601 of Ti-
tle VI requires the federal government to ensure that federal funds 
are not used to discriminate against people on the basis of race, 
color, or national origin.168 Section 602 requires federal agencies to 
promulgate regulations designed to implement Section 601.169 The 
EPA duly promulgated regulations. Most federal agencies, includ-
ing the EPA, have adopted such regulations under their Section 602 
authority.170 
During the nearly thirty-five years since the Civil Rights Act was 
passed, it has become clear that racial minorities in the United States 
are burdened by a disproportionate share of environmental risks.171 
                                                                                                             
 165 Current Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana Population, Demographics and Stats 
in 2016, 2017, supra note 161. 
 166 Id. at 5. 
 167 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 168 Civil Rights Act § 601 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)) 
(providing that “[n]o person shall . . . , on the ground of race, color, or national 
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”). 
 169 Civil Rights Act § 602 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 
(2012)). 
 170 Agency-Specific Civil Rights Information, DEP’T. OF JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/crt/agency-specific-civil-rights-information (last visited Jan. 5, 
2017). 
 171 See generally Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The 
Racial Divide in Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, 15 NAT’L L.J. S2 
(1992) (documenting glaring inequities between how agencies enforced environ-
mental laws in communities of color and majority white communities); 1 U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA230-R-92-008A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: 
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 3 (1992); D. R. Wernette & L. A. Nieves, 
Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, 18 EPA J. 
16, 17 (1992); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC 
WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL 
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Study after study documents the same result. Even studies that con-
trol for urbanization and socioeconomics document that the racial 
composition of a community is the best predictor for proximity to 
polluting facilities like hazardous waste facilities.172 The plight of 
Mossville is only one example of how seriously this kind of racially-
disparate treatment can harm a community.173 Unfortunately, Moss-
ville is also an example of a glaring blind spot in United States do-
mestic law—one that leaves the residents of Mossville without a 
remedy.174 
At first blush, Mossville seems like exactly the kind of discrim-
inatory situation that the Civil Rights Act was intended to remedy.175 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has limited the “majestic 
sweep”176 of the Act in a fashion that eviscerates the Act’s promised 
protections for environmental justice claimants. First, in both Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Developmental 
Corp.177 and Washington v. Davis,178 the Supreme Court limited the 
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment solely to acts of intentional dis-
crimination. Then, in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VI reaches only conduct 
that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.179 
                                                                                                             
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS 
WASTE SITES (1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168, 
SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH 
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983). 
 172 See generally Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 171. 
 173 See generally id. 
 174 See Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 15–31. 
 175 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
 176 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978). 
 177 429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977). 
 178 426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976). 
 179 Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 287; accord Alexander v. Choate, 
469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (threading together the multiple opinions in Guardian 
Association v. Civil Service Commission of N.Y.C. to find a ruling that Title VI 
reached only instances of intentional discrimination). See generally Guardian 
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C, 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
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Thus, a plaintiff asserting a civil rights violation under Section 
601 must prove intentional discrimination; a showing of discrimina-
tory effect or impact is not enough.180 Unfortunately, that has meant 
that the Civil Rights Act cannot help the citizens of Mossville.181 
Even though multiple studies have demonstrated that minority com-
munities in general, and Mossville residents in particular, are ex-
posed to significantly more environmental pollution than are their 
white counterparts, it is next to impossible to prove that the siting of 
any particular facility was driven by the intent to discriminate.182 
Absent explicit evidence of a racially-discriminatory motive, even 
siting decisions that are “insensitive and illogical,” will fail to satisfy 
this extremely stringent standard.183 As a result, United States courts 
faced with environmental justice claims have repeatedly found that 
“the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to 
equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial 
groups.”184 
Regulations promulgated under Section 602 have been rendered 
similarly toothless. In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Com-
mission of N.Y.C.,185 the Supreme Court held that while Section 601 
requires proof of discriminatory intent, agencies may validly adopt 
regulations implementing Title VI that also prohibit discriminatory 
effects. However, in Alexander v. Sandoval,186 the Supreme Court 
blunted the impact of Section 602 by concluding that there was no 
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under that 
Section.187 Thus, communities like Mossville have no remedy under 
United States law.188 
                                                                                                             
 180 Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677, 679–80 (S.D. Tex. 
1979), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 181 See Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 26. 
 182 See id. at 8, 26; see, e.g., Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677, 679–80. See generally 
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 171. 
 183 Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 681. 
 184 R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
 185 463 U.S. 582, 587 (1983). 
 186 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). 
 187 Id. (holding that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does 
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce 
regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of ac-
tion exists.”). 
 188 Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 15–31. 
2018] THE CLIMATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 341 
 
Reframing their complaint in the language of human rights of-
fered Mossville residents a path forward.189 Where United States do-
mestic law could not see Mossville’s complaint, human rights law 
is more encompassing because it recognizes the interwoven nature 
of human rights and the environment.190 Indeed, it has become a 
well-accepted principle of international law that that full enjoyment 
of human rights depends on protection against environmental 
harms.191 To that end, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination included environmental racism as a state policy and 
practice that violates fundamental human rights.192 And, by encom-
passing state actions that have the effect of preventing equal enjoy-
ment of fundamental human rights, this vision of equality goes well 
beyond the narrow United States Supreme Court equal protection 
jurisprudence. 
By bringing a claim before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, the Mossville plaintiffs were finally able to argue 
that there was a problem with the very structure of United States 
law.193 It was only by leaving the jurisdiction of the United States 
Supreme Court that Mossville’s residents could argue that the 
Court’s Title VI jurisprudence created an untenable legal stand-
ard.194 In Mossville Environmental Action Now v. United States, 
Mossville’s citizens could finally assert that the domestic law inter-
pretation of equality that denied them the opportunity to raise their 
claims in the United States was itself a human rights violation—de-
priving them of equality before the law.195 The Mossville plaintiffs 
also had the opportunity to raise their substantive claims about the 
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harm to health and welfare from the operations of the fourteen facil-
ities located in their community.196 By agreeing to hear the case, the 
Inter-American Commission created the possibility of a new consid-
eration within the United States of how its domestic law falls short 
of international human rights standards.197 
This kind of space for legal argument will be invaluable in the 
climate context. The Inuit Petition is a good example of the legal 
changes that can come from access to an international tribunal to 
raise a human rights claim.198 The Inuit Petition marked a definitive 
moment in the legal conversation about the relationship between hu-
man rights and climate change.199 The Petition alleged that the 
United States’ carbon emissions (and lack of a climate change pol-
icy) violated Inuit rights to culture, property, health, life, food, and 
family.200 
By any conventional legal standard, the Inuit surely “lost”—
their petition was dismissed as nonjusticiable, with the Commission 
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concluding that “the information provided does not enable us to de-
termine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a vio-
lation of rights protected by the American Declaration.”201 Yet in 
terms of taming the super-wicked problem of climate change, the 
Inuit Petition was a critical first step. It not only forced the question 
of climate change onto the Commission’s agenda, but also prompted 
the Commission toward action.202 The Inuit Petition was dismissed 
in November 2006;203 however, by March 2007, the Commission 
had convened a hearing to explore the links between human rights 
and climate change.204 The Inuit Petitioners were invited to provide 
testimony at that hearing.205 During the 2015 run up to the Paris 
Agreement, the Commission “recognized that the realization of the 
right to life, and to physical security and integrity is necessarily re-
lated to and in some ways dependent upon one’s physical environ-
ment.”206 By providing both the lever and the proverbial place to 
stand, the Inuit Petition used access to the international legal tribunal 
to move the world.207 As such, the Petition underscores the vital con-
nection between political mobilization and human-rights centered 
strategies. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Climate change is truly a super-wicked problem that challenges 
human society on all fronts—it stretches legal and political institu-
tions beyond their current boundaries even as it simultaneously 
erodes the bio-geophysical underpinnings upon which those institu-
tions rest. If we are to succeed in keeping the effects of anthropo-
genic greenhouse gases within parameters amenable to human ex-
istence, we will need new ways to conceptualize our human-created 
legal and social institutions. Invoking human rights can help. Think-
ing about climate change in human rights terms offers a relatively 
new, cross-cutting way to restructure critical institutions—one 
which transcends national boundaries, empowers ordinary citizens, 
and reorients bureaucratic decision-making. 
This kind of an approach views law and rights as elements of 
struggle that must “be politicized before they are legalized.”208 Hu-
man rights does this by reframing environmental disputes and redi-
recting attention away from experts, from technical specifications, 
and from legal categories. Instead, human rights focuses attention 
on ordinary people and on questions of equality and fundamental 
justice. As such, human rights can move marginalized groups and 
issues to the center. It is this potential for reframing that gives the 
narrative of human rights so much power. Human rights are one of 
the few legal theories capable of taming some of the super-wicked 
institutional challenges posed by climate change, and thus creating 
a “place to stand” from which to confront climate change’s bio-ge-
ophysical challenges. 
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